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INTRODUCTION

A. History
Article V of the United States Constitution sets forth the respective powers of the states and Congress in the amendment process.' At
first blush, the amendment process outlined in article V appears
uncomplicated and straightforward. Congress can propose amendments and determine whether ratification will be accomplished by
state legislatures or state conventions. 2 Three-fourths of the state
legislatures or state conventions must ratify a proposed amendment
before it becomes part of the Constitution. 3 The history of the
amendment process confirms the apparent simplicity of that provision
of article V which empowers Congress to propose amendments. To
date, all twenty-six amendments have been proposed by Congress and
4
all but one have been ratified by state legislatures.
Article V, however, also provides that Congress "on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments." 5 This short statement
raises important but heretofore unanswered questions about the callU.S. CONST. art. V, provides in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ....
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 The twenty-first amendment, which repealed prohibition, was proposed by Congress and
ratified by state conventions. See E.S. BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

5 See supra note 1.

3 (1970).
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ing and conduct of a national convention to propose amendments. For
example, what constitutes a valid application by a state legislature for
a national convention? What procedures must a state follow in submitting an application? Must the precise language of the proposed
amendment be included within the application? How similar must the
language be in the applications of various states in order to permit
Congress to count them? How long does an application by a state
remain valid? May a state rescind its application? If so, under what
conditions? What is the extent of Congress' power to review state
applications? What institution of government controls the agenda of
the convention-the state legislatures, Congress, the convention itself?
May Congress refuse to submit the work product of the convention to
the states for ratification and, if so, under what circumstances? How
will delegates to the convention be selected? How will votes at the
convention be counted? How will other procedures for the conduct of
the convention be established? How will the convention be financed?
If Congress assumes the power to answer some or all of these questions, are its determinations subject to review by any other institution
of government, such as the courts?6
At present, there are no guidelines in article V or elsewhere
defining the procedures that should be followed by the states, Congress and the convention in performing their respective roles in the
calling and conduct of a national constitutional convention. The history of this provision of article V is as silent as the text. There has
never been a national convention called pursuant to article V. Indeed,
there has not been a national convention since the one that drafted the
Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787.
Moreover, the revolutionary change in the structure of the national government which resulted from the 1787 Convention haunts
current consideration of a constitutional convention. The 1787 Convention was called for the express purpose of amending the Articles of
Confederation to eliminate state interference with interstate commerce. 7 Nevertheless, the Founding Fathers acted beyond this mandate and created an entirely new charter of government. Despite its
indisputably magnificent and successful work product, the 1787 Convention has been considered a "runaway" convention. 8

See, e.g., 127 CONG. REc. S2790 (daily ed. March 26, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Hatch with
respect to S. 817).
See Mathias, What's the Constitution among Friends?, 67 A.B.A. J. 861, 861-62 (1981).
1 Gunther, Constitutional Brinksmanship: Stumbling toward a Convention, 65 A.B.A. J.
1046, 1047 (1979).
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Almost from the beginning of our national government under the
Constitution of 1787, state legislatures have submitted applications
petitioning Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing
amendments. The subjects of the proposed amendments have involved
both individual rights and institutional power.' Indeed, state legislatures have intentionally used the application for a convention as "a
burr under the saddle of Congress, pricking it to use its own amendment-[initiation] process" under article V.10 The seventeenth amendment, providing for the direct election of Senators, and the twentyfirst amendment, repealing prohibition, for example, were proposed
by Congress only after a substantial number of state legislatures had
applied to Congress for a convention to propose such amendments."
B. The Present Situation
As of this writing, the legislatures of a number of states have
reportedly submitted applications to Congress petitioning it to call a
convention for the purpose of proposing a balanced-budget amendment.12 Accordingly, it is possible that within the very near future
thirty-four state legislatures will have reason to believe that the article
V duty of Congress to call a national convention has been triggered.
Congressional response to the massing state applications for a
convention on the balanced-budget amendment has taken two forms:
first, Congress is considering proposing a constitutional amendment
which would require a balanced federal budget; 13 second, Congress is
currently considering two bills which establish procedures for the
calling and conduct of a convention to propose amendments. S. 817,
introduced by Senator Hatch, and S. 600, introduced by Senator
Helms, propose similar but not identical solutions to the potential
constitutional crisis created by the numerous unanswered questions
4
raised by a national convention.1
Both bills assume that Congress has the power to define procedures for the calling and conduct of a convention, that a limited
'

See A.B.A.

SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

STUDY COMMITTEE, AMENDMENT

OF

V 59 app. B (1974) [hereinafter
(appendix B contains a tabulation of article V applications

THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE

cited as SPECIAL

COMMITTEE REPORT]

by state and subjects, submitted since 1789).
10 Mathias, supra note 7, at 861.

Id.
Id. As of July 1981, the legislatures of 30 states had passed resolutions petitioning
Congress to call for a constitutional convention for the purpose of passing a balanced-budget
amendment. In August 1982, the Senate passed, by a vote of 69 to 31, a resolution that seeks to
amend the Constitution to require a balanced budget. S.J. Res. 58, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REc. S9719-78 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1982).
13 N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1979, at A24, col. 3.
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S2794-96 (1981); id. at S1675-76.
"
1
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agenda convention can be called by the states, and that the assembled
convention cannot exceed the scope of the agenda defined in Congress'
call. If the requisite number of states petition Congress to call a
general convention for amending the Constitution, Congress presumably would be obligated to do so under the procedures outlined in
these bills. In both bills, Congress insures its preeminent role in the
amendment-by-convention process by placing the state legislatures
and the convention on notice that it will not report to the states for
ratification the work product of a "runaway" convention.
The bills differ markedly, however, in providing for judicial
review of Congress' determinations. S. 600 provides that the judgment
of Congress is final with respect to the procedures to be followed by
the convention itself, including its method of voting, and will be
binding on the states as well as on state and federal courts. In contrast,
S. 817 provides for judicial review of Congress' determinations utilizing the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. No standard of
judicial review, however, is specified.
This is not the first time that Congress has approached the subject
of procedures for a constitutional convention. Recognizing that the
nation was then venturing into the uncharted waters of a national
convention in the wake of the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, Senator Sam Ervin introduced a procedures bill in 1967 for the
convention method of amending the Constitution. Senator Ervin's bill
finally passed the Senate in October, 1971, but died in the House
15
Judiciary Committee.
Bills similar to the Ervin proposal were introduced in later Congresses but failed to attract any interest in the House. Now, however,
because of the number of state applications to Congress to convene a
convention to consider a balanced-budget amendment, interest in
defining procedures for the calling and conduct of a national convention by scholars, legislatures, the organized bar and the public has
increased dramatically.
C. The Special Committee Report
There has been substantial scholarly commentary with respect to
the constitutional issues raised by the article V convention.' 6 In 1974,
Is S.

2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 23,006-07 (1967).
10 An extensive collection of materials on the subject of an article V constitutional convention
is contained in Constitutional Convention Procedures, 1979: Hearings on S. 3, S. 520, and S.
1710 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as ConstitutionalConvention ProceduresHearings]. See
generally AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TO
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after more than two years of extensive research, a special committee of
the American Bar Association prepared a thorough analysis of the
problems raised by article V. In its report, entitled Amendment of the
Constitution By the Convention Method Under Article V (Special
Committee Report), the ABA Committee concluded that "Congress
has the power to establish procedures governing the calling of a
national constitutional convention" and that it would be highly desirable for Congress to enact such legislation in advance of any " 'contemporaneously felt need' by the required two-thirds of the state
legislatures." 17
The Special Committee Report also determined that procedures
legislation could limit the agenda of a national convention to a particular subject matter, reasoning that if two-thirds of the states petition
Congress to call a limited purpose convention, article V requires
Congress to call such a convention.' 8 A corollary of the Special
Committee Report's conclusion was that if Congress had the power to
call a limited purpose convention, it also had the power to limit the
work product of the convention to the subject matter of its call and to
enforce that limitation by refusing to submit to the states for ratification any proposed amendment beyond the scope of its call. 9
Congress, according to the Special Committee Report, is empowered under the Constitution to determine whether a proper application for a national convention was submitted, whether it was timely,
and whether and under what conditions a state legislature could
withdraw such an application. The Special Committee Report concluded that the national convention rather than Congress should decide the question of voting at the convention for purposes of proposing
an amendment.2 0 The final recommendation of the Special Committee Report was that any congressional legislation on the subject of an
article V convention should provide for limited judicial review of
determinations made by Congress. 2 ' The scope of the recommended
judicial review, however, was not discussed.
D. The Committee's Work
After studying recent scholarship examining the original intent of
the Founding Fathers in drafting article V, reviewing post-Special
REQUIRE A BALANCED FEDERAL BuDGer (1970); The Committee on Federal Legislation, Proposed

ProceduresforFederal ConstitutionalConventions (S. 215), 27 REC. A.B. Ci'y N.Y. 327 (1972).
17 SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 8-9.
'8
"

Id. at 9, 18, 19, 30, 31.
Id. at 17-20, 31-33.

20 Id. at 10, 19-20.
21 Id. at 9-10, 20-25.

CONVENTION PROCEDURES

1982]

Committee Report decisions with respect to the availability of judicial
review of questions likely to be raised by the convention process, and
considering new legislative proposals defining convention procedures,
we concluded that another report on the subject of article V and
proposed procedures bills was warranted. Rather than cover wellexamined areas of the article V problems, however, our Committee
chose to limit its investigation to an examination of two important
areas of concern raised by these bills: 1) the power of the states to
apply to Congress for the calling of a limited agenda constitutional
convention; and 2) the possibility of judicial review of congressional
decisions regarding the calling and conduct of a convention.
After an in-depth study of these questions, we agree with the
Special Committee Report that a procedures bill precisely outlining
the responsibilities of the states and Congress in the calling and conduct of a national convention is desirable. While we recognize that
promulgating such procedures may encourage a spate of single-issue
applications, we believe that it is more desirable to set forth the
procedures in advance of the requisite thirty-four applications than to
suffer the risks of a potential constitutional crisis.
The Committee also believes that some form of judicial review
within the context of article V is desirable, but we do not think it can
be approached in any monolithic fashion. In the years following the
Special Committee Report's assessment of the likelihood of judicial
review in the context of article V, the Court has demonstrated an
increased reluctance to define the constitutional limitations of judicial
power so as to permit judicial monitoring of the institutional responsibilities of the coordinate branches. At the very least, there is increased
doubt that the reasoning of Baker v. Carr2 2 and Powell v. McCormack 23 affords a realistic basis upon which to premise judicial review
of all congressional determinations pursuant to its responsibilities under article V. In our judgment, the likelihood of judicial review, even
if expressly provided for in the procedures legislation, will depend on
the precise article V question raised.
II.

THE

POWER

OF STATES TO APPLY FOR A

LIMITED AGENDA CONVENTION

The procedures bills pending in Congress provide that state legislatures can petition Congress to call a national convention to propose
an amendment on a specific subject. If the state legislatures desire a
general convention, the procedures bills permit them to include that
22

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

23 395 U.S. 486 (1972).
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purpose in their applications. The pending procedures bills also attempt to reduce the likelihood of a "runaway" convention by their
provision that Congress will not refer to the states for ratification
amendments of a convention that exceeds the scope of its call.
There is a deceptively simple but attractive logic to the theory of
the proposed procedures legislation: article V permits Congress to
convene either a general or a limited purpose convention depending
on what the state legislatures specify in their applications. With some
reservations, we endorse the approach of the proposed legislation,
believing that it is adequately supported by traditional constitutional
doctrine and contemporary practice.
A. The Scholarly Debate in Historical Context
If contemporary practice alone were the guarantee of constitutional legitimacy, there would be no difficulty in approving the proposition that states may limit the agenda of a national convention.
Since the Nebraska petition of 1893, states have repeatedly submitted
applications to Congress on the assumption that they could limit the
agenda of an article V convention to proposing amendments about a
24
single subject.
Our research discloses that before 1893, with one possible exception,2 5 states submitted applications only for general agenda conventions.26 No one appears to know with certainty why the practice
suddenly changed. Yet the apparent assumption that limited agenda
conventions are appropriate under article V became so widely accepted that from 1929 to 1957 not a single state submitted an application for a general convention, 27 and from 1958 to the present only one
state appears to have submitted such an application.2 8 Moreover, the
convention procedures bills placed before Congress in the last fifteen
29
years treat limited agenda conventions as the norm.
24 SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 20-25.
25

Id.

268 See

C. BRICEFIELD, PROBLEMS RELATING
SEss. 89-91 (Comm. Print 1957).

TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 85TH

CONG., 1ST
27

Id.

The description of the application reads:
[M]emorial of the Legislature of the State of Virginia memorializing the President
and the Congress of the United States relative to calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the United States; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.
111 CONG. REc. 94 (1965).
29 E.g., S. 600, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 127 CONG. REc. S1675-76 (1981) (Senator Helms);
S. 817, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), 127 CoNG. REc. S2794-96 (1981) (Senator Hatch); S. 3, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979) (Senator Helms); S. 520, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979) (Senator
28
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Unlike the key governmental institutions in our national life
which have accepted without any dissent the practice of limited
agenda conventions, scholarly commentary has failed to reach a consensus. In A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions,30 probably the
first extensive treatment of the subject, Judge John Jameson undertook
to discredit the notion that every assembly of the people for amending
their basic law is necessarily beyond the law, or revolutionary in
character. He argued that conventions are ordinary mechanisms of
government to be limited, like other mechanisms of government, in
the carefully wrought constitutional balance of power. 31 According
to Judge Jameson, the legislature, in particular, "has a clear constitutional right, in its discretion, to prescribe the scope of the duties of the
Convention it calls ....*32 In his view, constitutional conventions
did not, as some had claimed before and during the Civil War, possess
illimitable sovereignty.3 3 Jameson's argument, novel as it was, apparently bore fruit in the 105 state applications for conventions on
34
particular subjects between 1893 and 1916.
Despite its practical success, Jameson's approach met with intense academic criticism. Walter Dodd, in The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions (1910), and Roger Hoar, in Constitutional
Conventions: Their Nature, Powers and Limitations (1917), challenged Jameson's attempt to tame or "constitutionalize" conventions,
specifically state conventions for the amendment of state constitutions. In their view, conflict between the legislature and the convention could be avoided only, in Dodd's words, "if the convention as an
organ for constitutional revision is entirely freed from the control of
the regular legislature." 35 Legislative restrictions on the powers of a
36
convention, Dodd argued, diminish its usefulness.

Helms); S. 1710, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), 125 CONG. REc. S11,871-72 (1979) (Senator Hatch);
S. 1272, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1973) (Senator Ervin).
30 J.JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR HISTORY, POWERS, AND
MODES OF PROCEEDING (4th ed. 1887).
31 Id. §§ 320-321, at 315-17.
32 Id. § 379, at 364.
33 Id. §§ 311-313, 377-378.
34 See C. BRICKFIELD, supra note 26, at 89-91.
35 See W. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 92 (1910).
3 Id. at 79. Nowhere do Dodd or Hoar discuss limiting the power of a federal constitutional
convention. Certainly a state constitutional convention, whose call traditionally proceeds directly from a single legislature, can be distinguished from a national convention under article V,
whose call proceeds indirectly from two-thirds of the state legislatures by petitions to Congress.
Nevertheless, nothing in either Dodd's or Hoar's treatise suggests such a distinction. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that both would extend their argument to encompass state legislatures
acting together under article V to limit a national convention.
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Dodd's and Hoar's argument was one of utility, not constitutional power. The constitutional dimension was added by Lester
Orfield in The Amending of the Federal Constitution. State legislatures, Orfield asserted, have no authority to limit a national convention called pursuant to the Constitution. "[T]he right of the legislatures," he wrote, "is confined to applying for a convention, and any
statement of purposes in their petitions would be irrelevant as to the
37
scope of powers of the convention."
The difficulty with the constitutional argument as explained by
Professor Orfield is that it is predicated on the supremacy clause, not
the text and function of article V. The proposition that state legislatures cannot limit a federal instrumentality, stated abstractly, may be
correct. 38 However, if the Constitution, and in particular article V of
the Constitution, provides or should be interpreted to provide for
limiting the convention instrumentality, then Orfield's proposition
would appear to fail.
Commencing with a Yale Law Journal article in 1963 3 and
continuing in two well-publicized letters to distinguished members of
Congress, 40 Professor Black has reconstructed Professor Orfield's argument. He has also influenced and encouraged a generation of scholars
to reject the limited convention idea based on the text and function of
article V. 41 The key idea underlying recent scholarship opposing
limited conventions is that amendments to the federal Constitution
ought to originate only from a fully deliberative body of national
scope. 42 This assumption stems, in part, from an examination of
37 See L. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 45 (1942).
31 See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426-27 (1819).
11 Black, The ProposedAmendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957,
962-64 (1963).
40 See Black, Amendment by National ConstitutionalConvention: A Letter to a Senator, 32
OKLA. L. REv. 626 passim (1979); Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 196-204 (1972).
41 Proceduresfor Calling ConstitutionalConventions: Hearings on S. 2307 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 60,
61-63 (1967) (statement of Alexander M. Bickel); id. at 230-31 (letter from Alexander M.
Bickel to Phillip B. Kurland (Oct. 2, 1967) (discussing S. 2307)) [hereinafter cited as Bickel
Letter]; see Ackerman, Unconstitutional Convention, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 1979, at 8; Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" ConstitutionalConvention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623,
1630-36 (1979); Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution,
14 GA. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1979); Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627 n.* (1979);
Voegler, Amending the Constitution by the Article V Convention Method, 55 N.D.L. REv. 355
(1979). But see Van Alstyne, The Limited Constitutional Convention- The Recurring Answer,
1979 DUKE L.J. 985; Van Alstyne, Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited
Conventions Only?-A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 Duke L.J. 1295.
41 The pedigree of this important idea, for recent scholarship at least, seems to derive from
Professor Black's article, The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, supra
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basic constitutional materials, and, in part, from a judgment regarding what is practical and desirable in our modern system of government.
1. Basic ConstitutionalMaterials
The anti-limited agenda convention argument relies on an examination of the language of article V, the debates of the framers of
43
article V, and state practices under article V from 1789 to 1893.
a. The Language of Article V
Article V refers to "a Convention for proposing Amendments."
Does this phrase mean "a Convention for proposing Amendments the
Convention decides to propose," or "a Convention for proposing such
Amendments as the States applying for a Convention authorize it to
propose?" The language can be construed as supporting either a broad
or narrow grant of power to the convention.
Anti-limitation scholars advance at least two arguments in favor
of a broad grant of power. First, applications under a statute typically
track the language of the statute in order to ensure the validity of the
application. Following this principle, a state legislature must apply to
Congress for "a Convention for proposing Amendments." It cannot
apply for a convention limited by subject matter or a convention for
proposing specific amendments. Since a state cannot simultaneously
limit its application and track the language of article V, anti-limitation scholars conclude that states cannot limit the agenda of a national
44
convention.

note 39, at 963. Professor Black does not, however, cite any sources. Nonetheless, the idea
continues to convince scholars examining the issues raised by an article V convention. See, e.g.,
Dellinger, supra note 41, at 1625-26; Gunther, supra note 41, at 17-18; Note, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 85 HAnv. L. REv.
1612, 1630 (1972); Note, Proposing Amendments to the United States Constitution by Convention, 70 H.Av. L. REv. 1067, 1071-72 (1957); Bickel Letter, supra note 41, at 231.
11 State courts have decided many cases where a state legislature attempted to limit the
agenda of a state constitutional convention. See Annot., 158 A.L.R. 512 (1945) (powers of state
legislatures to limit the powers of a state constitutional convention). The availability of limited
calls has commonly depended on several factors, including the language of the state constitution.
However, no court has had to confront the question whether a state legislature can effectively
limit the agenda of a national convention called pursuant to article V. A note in the Harvard
journal on Legislation, however, takes the position that the state experience illuminates the
federal question. See Note, Limited Federal Constitutional Conventions: Implications of the
State Experience, 11 HARV. J. oN LEis. 127 (1973).
44 See Black, Amendment by National Constitutional Convention: A Letter to a Senator,
supra note 40, at 628-29.

540
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Second, the term "Convention" in article V occupies the same
grammatical position as the term "Congress." The drafter of a statute,
the anti-limitation scholars assert, uses two terms in the same grammatical position only if he intends that they should perform an identical statutory function. Since article V empowers Congress to originate
amendments without limitation, it follows, according to the suggested
rule of interpretation, that a convention should have the same power.
Moreover, the argument continues, neither collateral language in the
Constitution nor direct, unambiguous historical evidence vitiates the
presumption of functional identity derived from this construction of
article V. The function to be performed by an article V convention
cannot in any historically defensible way be distinguished from that
performed by Congress: they are the sole and apposite sources of
45
constitutional amendments.
Yet even according to its own terms, this suggested construction
of article V is not convincing. Placing the convention by itself in
apposition to Congress is both grammatically and functionally inapt.
The convention does not stand alone in its branch of the amending
process. It is one of three stages-state application, congressional call,
and the convention itself-that Congress, when it is the source of
amendments, compresses into one. The grammatical and functional
comparison of the convention method with Congress, we believe,
neither determines the distribution of the agenda-setting activity
among the constituent stages of the convention method nor supports
the proposition that agenda-setting is a monopoly of the convention.
b. Debates of the Framers on Article V
Recent scholarship suggests certain key themes in the debates of
the framers concerning article V. In 1979, Professor Walter Dellinger
-published a review of the framers' debates, in which he concluded:
The accounts of the Philadelphia Convention do not expressly answer the question of whether a convention can be limited by either
the states or by Congress. Two themes, however, do emerge from
the debates: Congress should not have exclusive power to propose
amendments; and state legislatures should not be able to propose

45 Professor Van Alstyne attributes this argument to Professor Black. See Van Alstyne, Does
Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions?-A Letter to a Colleague, 1978
DuKE L.J. 1295, 1297. If one scrupulously examines the passage cited by Professor Van Alstyne,
however, one does not find support for the argument he asserts. See Black, Amending the
Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, supra note 40, at 198. The argument is nonetheless a
good one, applying Professor Black's principles of structure and relationship in an apt and
elegant fashion. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
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and ratify amendments that enhance their power at the expense of
the national government. States were empowered under Article V
to ratify amendments; the power to propose amendments was
lodged in two national bodies, Congress and a convention. The
proceedings suggest that the framers did not want to permit enactment of amendments by a process of state proposal followed by
state ratification without the substantive involvement of a national
forum. Permitting the states to limit the subject matter of a consti46
tutional convention would be inconsistent with this aim.

It is possible to accept Professor Dellinger's reading of the framers' debates without reaching his conclusion. Limiting the subject
matter of a constitutional convention can be quite consistent with
using it as a neutral national forum. Far from laying siege to the
convention from two sides, the power of states to limit the agenda of a
convention may be balanced, in part, by the counter power of Congress to judge the extent of the limit. Limited applications do not
clearly tilt the convention in the direction of either Congress or the
states (assuming states have one direction). Furthermore, Congress
supplies the "substantive involvement of a national forum," at least
with respect to agenda-setting. Finally, the convention, even one
whose agenda has been limited, provides a forum for debate.
One ought not to confuse setting the agenda of a convention with
the freedom of delegates to the convention to deliberate with respect
to the set agenda. States submitting applications for a convention
whose agenda is limited to voting up or down a single amendment
take the risk, after all, that the convention, after plenary, deliberate
debate, will vote down the amendment. The wider the agenda, the
greater the probability of a result that is at least partially satisfactory
to those state legislatures which applied for the convention.
A limited convention "cannot," in some complex and possibly
sanctionless sense, originate amendments outside its agenda. 47 It is
not clear, however, that the power to originate amendments outside
an agenda two-thirds of the states would suggest is a practically
important power, since three-quarters of them must ratify whatever
amendments the convention originates. Of course, the political argu41 Dellinger, supra note 41, at 1630 (emphasis added). Professor Gunther makes the further
point that the limitation of an agenda may, for all practical purposes, be only apparent. See
Gunther, supra note 41, at 8-10. In a complex, interdependent society, any call, unless very
strictly and definitively defined (which is politically unlikely) to exclude all but certain subjects,
could be construed to include amendments whose subjects are superficially alien.
11 But recall Professor Gunther's insight that even a limited agenda may be honest, sincere
construction be legitimately expanded to include superficially far-ranging amendments. See
supra note 41.
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ment could be made that three-quarters of the states could be "steamrolled" into ratifying what two-thirds of them would not have proposed. Nevertheless, such a judgment is filled with hypothesis and
uncertainty. Moreover, "steamrolling" may not always be less democratic or desirable than other forms of expression of the popular will
48
that lead to adoption of amendments.
It may be correct that the convention whose agenda is limited by
the cooperation of Congress and the states loses a measure of independence and authority. Yet this is also a judgment filled with hypothesis
and uncertainty. Arguably, the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, for
example, was a limited convention which exceeded its agenda. Authority proceeds from necessity, as Judge Jameson observed, where a
grave national crisis demands extensive constitutional alteration. Accordingly, we believe it is erroneous to equate the effect of claims by
the states and Congress to control a convention, taken separately,
with the effect of such claims as they balance each other in the
political process of article V.
c. State Practice Under Article V
Brickfield's tabulation of state applications for national conventions through 1958 shows that before 1893 only a single application

48 In testimony before Senator Bayh's subcommittee on the Constitution, Professor Black
asked Senators to reject the limited convention idea on the ground, amongst others, that it is
potentially inconsistent with the form of democracy that extends legitimacy only to actions that
meet with the approval of a vast majority of the national electorate. A popular mandate, he
argued, at once accords with the spirit of democracy and provides the overwhelming consensus
that ought to accompany amendment of our basic law. Ratification of amendments by threequarters of the states is no guarantee of national consensus since it is possible to assemble 38 states
containing only 40% of the population.
In Professor Black's view, the only guarantee of national consensus is that the forum
originating amendments be a national forum representing the electorate on the basis of population. Congress, more precisely the House, is such a forum. A convention whose delegates are
selected by population is such a forum. If two-thirds of the states could use their applications to
constrain the convention to originate amendments reflecting the sectarian interest of the applying states, which amendments three-quarters of the states could ratify, then 40 % of the electorate, theoretically, could overcome the wishes of 60 %. See ConstitutionalConvention Procedures
Hearings, supra note 16, at 177, 181-82 (testimony of Prof. Charles L. Black, Jr.). Far from
proving the case against the limited convention, however, Professor Black's argument demonstrates that limited conventions fit the broad intentions of the framers. First, Professor Black does
not convince us that delegates elected to a convention on the basis of population would choose to
be bypassed and originate an unpopular amendment. Second, even if delegates choose to
originate an unpopular amendment, which states representing 40% of the population then
ratified, it is not clear that the result fails to accord with fundamental constitutional premises.
After all, a dominant theme of the framers was that populous states ought not be automatically
able to defeat the interests of unpopulous states. Democracy by sheer numbers was not and has
never been the essence of our constitutionalism.
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purported in any way to limit the convention. 49 Since 1893, however, the limited convention application has become the norm. Nevertheless, it is argued by the anti-limitation scholarship that early state
practice reveals the intent of the framers 0 and that the change in
practice is "a child of the twentieth century"' and an egregious
departure from the constitutional command of the framers.
The practice argument is superficially plausible. One is permitted in our legal tradition to look to practice in order to construe
ambiguous terms of a constitution or statute. Yet the practice referred
to in the anti-limitation scholarship does not clearly or convincingly
support their construction of article V.
First, between 1789 and the Nebraska petition of 1893 on direct
election of Senators, only nine applications for an article V convention
to Congress. The following chart
were submitted by state legislatures
2
5
petitions:
these
describes
State

Year

Subject Matter of Petition

Virginia
New York
Georgia
Alabama

1788
1789
1832
1833

Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Ohio
Virginia

1861
1861
1861
1861
1861

general revision of Constitution
general revision of Constitution
general revision of Constitution
against protective tariff or
general revision of Constitution
general revision of Constitution
general revision of Constitution
general revision of Constitution
general revision of Constitution
general revision of Constitution

The Alabama application appears ambiguously as an application for
either a convention limited to originating an amendment to forbid a
protective tariff or a general convention. 53 Only eight applications in
a period stretching from 1788 to 1893 appear to call for a general
convention.
From 1893 to the present, however, more than two hundred
applications for a national convention to propose amendments on
limited subjects have been filed with Congress. Which represents the
"oSee supra note 26.
moSee, e.g., Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, supra note
40, at 202-03.
51 Id. at 203 (emphasis in original).
52 See C. BRICKFIELD, supra note 26, at 89-91.
51 See Black, Amending the Constitution:A Letter to a Congressman, supra note 40, at 189.
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dominant practice, two hundred applications or eight? Do eight applications over one hundred years constitute a practice of any sort?
And which is the relevant period in which to measure the relevant
practice, one hundred years from the founding or two hundred years?
Neither is sufficiently contemporaneous with the founding of the Constitution to make any compelling claim of authority.
Consider the general applications that were sufficiently contemporaneous: Virginia (1788) and New York (1789). Do we know the
circumstances under which these applications were forwarded to
Congress? The legislatures of Virginia and New York appear to have
been responding to the crisis of ratification of the Constitution from
the 1787 Convention, where an application for a general convention
was reasonable even if the common understanding was that a limited
convention was possible. The same argument holds for the secession
crisis of 1861, which produced five applications. The only application
that remains unclear is the Georgia application of 1832. Upon close
examination, therefore, the practice argument is not at all convincing.
Finally, even if the original practice was to call for general
conventions and this original practice comported with the intent of
.the framers, it may still not be binding precedent. Not every change in
constitutional practice is properly characterized as an usurpation. The
original intent of the framers, assuming they had an intent in a given
case or that we can discover what it was, can be used to determine
subordinate norms in one age that may not be valid in another, all the
while maintaining the authority of the original intent.
"[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." 54 Unlike an ordinary statute, the Constitution tolerates, even
welcomes, deliberate and organic change in the set of subordinate
norms which give content to its fundamental purposes and intentions.5 5 Due process, for example, or equal protection, have very
different operative meanings today than they did when their drafters
used them to specify not this or that particularly articulate intention
but a legitimate role for the development of intentions as the necessities of government and society may demand. Thus, the fundamental
question is not whether state practice regarding convention applica-

51 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
55See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204, 229 (1980). Even ordinary statutes commonly contain language that the drafter of the
statute fully expects to be suffused with a purpose or intention either that the drafter has not
sufficiently articulated or that he expects to be changed as the subject matter of the statute
requires. Statutes enabling the operations of administrative agencies are especially clear examples of such "constitutional statutes."
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tions in the 1890's departed from the original intention of the framers,
but whether the change in practice is legitimate and comprehensible
within the framework of article V.
We do not believe that the arguments about the original intent of
the framers, the structure of the amending process, and the first
century of apparent constitutional practices are sufficiently important
or persuasive to overturn the second century of practice, in which
limited agenda conventions have come to be the norm, or to disrupt
the institutional consensus in favor of limited agenda conventions.
Furthermore, the political effects of the contemporary practice are
not clearly deleterious in strictly political terms, as opponents of the
practice have charged. A change in practice gives rise to delicate issues
of constitutional interpretation.56 In our opinion, arguments about
"IOne

member of our Committee advances the following observations:
After the Civil War amendments, the states had responsibilities toward the federal government they did not have in 1789. For example, the states had to conform their laws to the
mandates of due process and equal protection. They also had to administer federal programs.
The host of particular burdens imposed on the states after the Civil War gave them a privilege, it
could be argued, to urge particular constitutional change in response to the imposition of the
burdens. The argument against legitimizing change in practice under article V focuses on the
difficulty or undesirability of implying change in those portions of the Constitution which deal
with the structure of government. It is easy to accept, as a general proposition, the principle that
the Constitution is not a static instrument. It is, however, quite difficult to describe precisely
how it can change. Clearly, not all parts of the Constitution are equally changeable. For
instance, it is now well established that the due process and equal protection guarantees were
designed to reflect contemporary notions of equality and "fundamental fairness" and not simply
to embody the value structure of an earlier age. The same is true of other civil liberties which are
meant to reflect our contemporary value system, particularly our conception of the proper
relationship of the individual to the state. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
While the structural relationships among the institutions of government created by the
Constitution have not generally been considered overtly mutable, the force of the argument
against implying change in the structure of government is diminished by the many instances in
which profound change has been accomplished. The independent administrative agencies, for
instance, have introduced a "fourth branch" of government that the framers certainly did not
intend. The development of administrative agencies from the delegation of far-reaching legislative and judicial powers appears all the more remarkable when one considers that it was
accomplished in the face of clear judicial precedent against such delegations. Surely, it is easier to
tolerate a change in constitutional practice respecting conventions, where it is not opposed by
judicial precedent. The evolution of doctrine expanding the operation of the commerce clause is
another change in structure, accomplished with the cooperation of the Court. The cases in the
first half of the nineteenth century, where the Court narrowed the power of states to tax, or
control a federal instrumentality (the Bank of the United States), present a third instance of
government structure evolving without amendment. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Change in a field in which the Court is constrained, as it may be in article V, not to
participate in the creation of constitutional norms on the ground that they are largely political
questions arguably is less troublesome than change in fields, such as the delegation doctrine, the
commerce clause and the taxing power, where the Court claims to make authoritative statements. Even the restraint with which the Court treats coordinate branches has changed-as, for
example, the increasing respect the Court has afforded to the military and foreign affairs powers
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practice are sufficiently complex and indeterminate to justify withholding the approving certainty that ought to accompany a severe
restriction on the power of the states that the anti-limitation scholarship endorses.
2. What Is Practicaland Desirable
in Our Modern Government?
A number of scholars envision the convention as a serious national occasion, a response of the popular will in state legislatures to
an unyielding, tyrannical Congress over fundamental issues of national political structure. They regard amendments on issues such as
school prayer, busing, and abortion as improper subjects of amendments which a convention ought to be called to originate even though
these are the subjects which have prompted the current applications
for a limited convention. They feel that confining a convention to
single issues invites control by elements of our political life willing to
sacrifice the general well-being and political cohesion of the nation to
one or a series of private visions. In their judgment, the only way to
ensure that a convention behaves in the manner of a politically responsible national organization is to require it to have a diverse representation of open ended interests, each competing in the convention
just as they do in Congress. To be politically responsible to a national
constituency, according to these scholars, delegates ought to be forced
to take a position on a variety of issues, each of which could easily
of the President. Finally, the growth of judicial power itself presents the most significant change
in government structure we have witnessed in two centuries of constitutional practice. Perhaps
the narrowest holding of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)-that the Court is
the final arbiter of the constitutional validity of statutes giving it jurisdiction pursuant to article
III of the Constitution-could be justified as fulfilling the intent of the framers. But the broader
claim the Court developed out of Marbury-that the Court is the final arbiter of the constitutional validity of all actions taken by the coordinate branches-is a change in the structure of
government which is not clearly rooted in the intent of the framers. Perhaps the best statement of
the possibility of structural change in the Constitution is that of Justice Frankfurter in his
concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case (where, however, he agreed with the opinion of the Court
that practice did not sanction the effort by President Truman to take over the nation's steel mills
without an authorizing act of Congress):
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant
the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply
them. It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon them. In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such
exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss
on "executive [plower" vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952).
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arise at a convention. They must be free to trade on the issues during
sessions of the convention, which they could not do in a limited
convention. Single-issue conventions, it is asserted, breed political
irresponsibility at every level: in the state legislatures submitting applications, in the election of delegates, and on the floor of the conven57
tion.
In these two respects-fear of the political irresponsibility a single-issue convention breeds and the reluctance to concede control of
the convention to an overweening Congress-the adherents of the
general agenda convention position have perhaps their most powerful
argument. On the other hand, congressional control of the convention
might be just what is needed to bring political responsibility to its
debates. Moreover, the pressure of single-issue politics might reduce
the political ambitions of a centralizing, tyrannical Congress. The
political calculus is not sufficiently exact to predict the result of these
contrary tendencies. Yet surely the concerns of the consensus ought to
be alleviated by the knowledge that, under certain political conditions, they offset each other.
One commentator who has recognized the inherently political
nature of the process of constitution-making is Professor Gerald Gunther of Stanford. In a recent article he took the position
that states may legitimately articulate the specific grievances
prompting their applications for a convention; that Congress may
heed those complaints by specifying the subject matter of the state
grievances in its call for a convention; but that the congressional
specification of the subject is not ultimately binding on the convention. Rather, the congressional specification serves the purpose of
informing the convention delegates of the subject matter that
prompted the applications and operates as a moral exhortation to
the convention. I insist, however, that the convention is a separate,
independent body ultimately not controllable by the applying
states or by the Congress issuing the call. . . . I believe that the
final authority to determine the convention's agenda rests with the
convention itself .... 58
The limiting application, in Professor Gunther's view, is not legally
binding in a court of law, as it would be for many today who support
the idea of a limited convention. To Professor Gunther it is a "moral
exhortation," a gesture in the struggle over the content of fundamen-

57 See, e.g., ConstitutionalConvention ProceduresHearings, supra note 16, at 254, 257, 259
(testimony of Walter E. Dellinger).
58 Gunther, supra note 41, at 12-13.
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tal law. Only if one accepts an especially intrusive judicial review of
the convention process-so that a court could be expected, for example, to second-guess Congress on its assessment of the subject matter
expressed in applications, or order Congress to send the work product
of a convention to the states for ratification-would the strictly legal
treatment of the effects of limited agenda applications be feasible.
Otherwise, we are forced to rely on the political interaction of units of
government. Even the legal treatment, as we know, depends on the
willingness of Congress and the executive to obey a court's order.
Professor Gunther sees no middle ground between law and moral
exhortation. In our view, it is neither accurate nor desirable to propose that short of judicial enforcement of limited agenda applications,
the convention is free to do as it pleases. Certainly, the limited agenda
application has some political force. Yet it also allows Congress,
should it choose, to refuse to send proposed amendments of the convention to the states for ratification. If a court were not available to
aid the convention in any struggle with Congress (and even if it were
available), how could the convention oppose the will of Congress?
Surely the answer is what it is at every stage of the amendment
process: a political controversy lying somewhere between law and
moral exhortation.
We believe that states and the Congress possess the power-both
political and constitutional-to limit the agenda of a convention.
Moreover, we recognize that there are judicially nonenforceable yet
compelling provisions of the Constitution. 59 We are also concerned
that, as Jameson pointed out over one hundred years ago, the convention always has the potential to exceed the institutional limits placed
on it. Nevertheless, the pending procedures legislation as well as the
article V requirement of ratification of amendments by the states
substantially diminish the risks of a "runaway" constitutional convention.
III.

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE ARTICLE V CONVENTION

Many disputes of constitutional, legal and political dimension are
bound to occur during the calling and conduct of an article V convention. Issues of individual rights and institutional power among the
delegates, Congress, the states and the convention itself will have to be
resolved quickly to protect the integrity of the amendment process.
Though the Supreme Court has considered and decided several issues
" See Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisionsof Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 54
(1931).
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respecting the article V amending process,60 it declined in Coleman v.
Miller" to decide two issues, on the ground that they presented nonjusticiable political questions.
However desirable it may be to assign courts the responsibility of
deciding the numerous and complex issues likely to arise in the context
of an article V convention, the Committee is persuaded that Supreme
Court pronouncements since Coleman v. Miller dealing with the "case
or controversy" limitation of article III will not guarantee judicial
review of all such issues. In each case, the availability of judicial
review will depend upon the nature of the issue presented. While
modern case law does not suggest a single, clear answer to the problem of judicial review of issues arising from the convention method of
originating amendments, Baker v. Carr6 2 provides a consensus of
criteria that will be used by the Supreme Court in deciding whether a
particular issue is justiciable. Though Congress cannot confer justiciability by statute on an issue that offends the "case or controversy"
limitation,6 3 provision of judicial review in the proposed convention
procedures legislation would serve to strengthen the case for justiciability under the criteria of Baker v. Carr.
A. Background
Prior to 1939 when it decided Coleman v. Miller, 4 the Supreme
Court, without providing a universal answer to the question of justiciability, addressed and resolved several specific issues raised by the
amendment process of article V: 1) whether Congress may choose the
"state legislature" method of ratification for proposed amendments
which expand federal power; 65 2) whether a proposed amendment
requires the approval of the President; 66 3) whether Congress may fix
a reasonable time for ratification of a proposed amendment by state
legislatures;6 7 4) whether the states may restrict the power of the
legislatures to ratify amendments or to submit the decision to a popular referendum; 6 8 and 5) the meaning of the requirement of a two60 See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922);
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hawke v.
Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
61 307 U.S. 433, 453-56 (1939).
62 369 U.S. 186, 210-11, 214-15 (1962).
63 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
64 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
61 United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 730 (1931).
66 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379 (1798).
67 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1921).
68 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229-31 (1920).
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thirds vote of each House.6 9 In none of these cases, however, was the
Court actually asked to inject itself into the actual amending process.
In each case, litigation was a post facto challenge to already promulgated amendments.
The subsequent case of Coleman v. Miller helped to define further the parameters of justiciability in the article V context by finding
that two issues raised nonjusticiable political questions, while not
rejecting the earlier decision in favor of justiciability. However, the
Court's decision in Coleman created some uncertainty whether the
Court would ultimately find that most article V issues are nonjusticiable. As the Special Committee Report noted:
In Coleman, the Court held that a group of state legislators who
had voted not to ratify the child labor amendment had standing to
question the validity of their state's ratification. Four Justices dissented on this point. The Court held two questions non-justiciable:
the issue of undue time lapse for ratification and the power of a
state legislature to ratify after having first rejected ratification. In
reaching these conclusions, the Court pointed to the absence of
criteria either in the Constitution or a statute relating to the ratification process. The four Justices who dissented on standing concurred on non-justiciability. They felt, however, that the Court
should have disapproved Dillon v. Gloss insofar as it decided judicially that seven years is a reasonable period of time for ratification, stating that Article V gave control of the amending process to
Congress and that the process was " 'political' in its entirety, from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution,
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at
any point." Even though the calling of a convention is not precisely
within these time limits and the holding in Coleman is not broad, it
is not at all surprising that commentators read that case as bringing
Article V issues generally within the rubric of "political questions. "

70

In the more recent decisions of Baker v. Carr7' and Powell v.
McCormack72 the Supreme Court laid to rest the notion that Coleman
signaled the Court's complete withdrawal from its previously active
role in this area of potential political questions. For example, in the
view of the Special Committee Report, Coleman, in turn, may have

61 National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920).
70

SPECIAL CoMMrrE REPoRT,

459 (1939)).
7- 369
712395

U.S. 186 (1962).
U.S. 486 (1969).

supra note 9, at 21-22 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,
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been significantly restricted by Baker and Powell. Arguably, for instance, the rationale of Powell, with its strong emphasis on the interest
of voters in having the person they elect take a seat in Congress, could
also control a situation where Congress refused to call a convention
despite the requisite number of petitions. Clearly, the convention
method was meant to permit the states, expressing the will of the
73
people, to bring about change despite congressional opposition.
Baker, moreover, may suggest that, despite dicta to the contrary in
Powell,7 4 the Court need not restrict itself to declaratory relief but
might fashion a more extensive remedy in vindicating such a frustra75
tion of the popular will.
In Baker v. Carr the Court set forth the fundamental principles
to be applied to political question problems. These principles constitute a modern consensus of analysis. 76 First, the Court will not
intervene where the issue involves resolution of questions committed
by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of the government. Accordingly, the provisions in the Constitution governing the
exercise of the power in question must be carefully examined. 77 Second, resolution of the question must not demand that a court move
beyond areas of judicial expertise. There must be no "lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the issue, and
the decision must not call for "an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion. ' 78 Third, the Court will abstain
when prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention.
Mutual respect among the three branches of government must be
encouraged by avoiding "the potentiality of embarrassment [that
would result] from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. ' 79 The prudential consideration discourages
judicial action where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made."'8 0
B. Recent Developments
In assessing whether the Supreme Court would consider possible
article V convention issues justiciable, we must give due regard not

" SPECIAL COMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at

23-24.

71 395 U.S. at 517-18.
7-SPECIAL COMMIrEE REPoRT, supra note 9,at 24.
70 369 U.S. at 297. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 519.
11 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
79 Id.
80 Id.
17
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only to Baker and to Powell, but also to the decisions of the Court in
more recent years. In the intervening years since those decisions and

the Special Committee Report, while adhering to the Baker v. Carr
criteria, the Court has taken advantage of available opportunities to
refine the concept of justiciability. Significantly, some of these cases
involved constitutional provisions which, like article V, concerned
institutional responsibilities rather than individual rights. These cases
manifest, at least at the hands of the present Court, a distinct propensity to acknowledge the right and responsibility of the other branches
to interpret definitively such clauses.
For instance, in United States v. Richardson,8 the Court held
that a private citizen did not have standing to maintain an action for
the enforcement of the accounts clause 82 since he could show no
"particular concrete injury" 83 from Congress' refusal to enforce the
clause against the Central Intelligence Agency. Relying on Ex parte
Levitt 84 the Court readily acknowledged that
[i]t can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate
this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any
particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support
to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. 85
Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion manifested an even greater
reluctance to involve the Court in such matters. Speaking of the
power of judicial review, he wrote:
The irreplaceable value of the power . . .[of judicial review] ...
lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and
liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some
amorphous general supervision of the operations of government,
that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has
permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon
which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests.86
Significantly, on the same day, the Court addressed the question
whether a citizen could judicially challenge Congress' nonenforce-

81 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
7.
sa United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177.
84 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
85 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
16 Id.

at 192.
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ment of the provisions of the incompatibility clause8 7 against its own
members.8 8 Again, the Court declined to entertain the issue, noting
that to allow such a suit would "distort the role of the Judiciary in its
relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing 'government by injunction.' "89
It may be argued that, since the foregoing cases concern primarily the question of standing, they are inapposite to a determination of
whether a particular issue raises a "political question." However, as
Chief Justice Warren pointed out in Flast v. Cohen,90 the standing
and political question inquiries have common constitutional roots in
the "case or controversy" requirement of article 111.1 In both situations, the Court must ultimately determine whether the dispute
presents a matter capable of judicial resolution. The common root of
these concepts is perhaps best illustrated by one of the cases which
reached the Court in the aftermath of the tragedy at Kent State. 2 In
Gilligan v. Morgan, the Court held that a request to submit the
training and operations of the Ohio National Guard to continuing
federal judicial scrutiny was nonjusticiable. That conclusion could be
articulated either as a lack of standing or as a political question
requiring judicial scrutiny of a subject committed expressly by the
Constitution "to a coordinate political department" 9 3 because of the
94
mandate of the militia clause.
Moreover, in Goldwater v. Carter,9 5 a case which presented the
question whether the President had the authority to terminate unilaterally the United States Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, Justice
Rehnquist (writing for himself and for three other Justices) took the
position that the case presented a political question. Significantly,
Justice Rehnquist argued that this conclusion followed a fortiori from
the Court's holding in Coleman v. Miller.96 Central to his analysis
was Chief Justice Hughes' observation in Coleman that article V
contains the explicit provision concerning ratification of an amendment by a state legislature and that Congress therefore retained final

87 U.S. CONST.

art. I,

§ 6, cl.

2.

88 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

89 Id. at 222.
00 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
91 Id. at 95.
02 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
93 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
9' 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
0 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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authority to decide "whether by lapse of time its proposal of the
amendment had lost its vitality prior to the required ratifications. '9 7
The Constitution is similarly silent on the manner in which a treaty is
to be terminated, Justice Rehnquist noted, and, since "different termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties," the
matter " 'must surely be controlled by political standards.' "98
This recent statement by a plurality of the Court can be construed as indicating willingness to accept the broad proposition that
certain governmental functions, including the termination of treaties
and the convention method of amending the Constitution, are committed entirely to the control of the political branches.99
On the other hand, Goldwater may be read as holding nonjusticiable only those issues where the Court would have to second-guess a
determination committed in the first instance to a coordinate branch
of the federal government and where, consequently, there is the distinct possibility of "multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."°0 0 Such a view of Goldwater is consistent
with Justice Powell's concurring opinion in which he asserts that
"[p]rudential considerations" rendered the question nonjusticiable because the dispute between the legislative and executive branches was
not
ready for judicial review unless and until each branch ha[d] taken
action asserting its constitutional authority. Differences between
the President and the Congress are commonplace under our system .... The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting
the allocation of power between the President and Congress until
the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. 0 1
However, according to the view of Justice Powell, the fact that a case
or controversy "touches" a matter normally related to a nonjudicial
branch does not render it nonjusticiable. Rather, the Court has the
duty "to say what the law is,"102 and the Court must necessarily

11Id. at

456.
98Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 1003 (quoting Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1302
(N.D. I11.
1975)).
99 If so, these Justices, like Justice Black and those who joined his separate opinion in
Coleman, would presumably hold that: "The process itself is 'political' in its entirety, from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point." Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 459.
100Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
101Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell J., concurring).
102 Id. at 1001 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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decide issues of textual construction, including whether "one branch
103
of our Government has impinged upon the power of another."
C. Prognosis
These recent developments culminating in Goldwater raise substantial doubt, in the Committee's view, regarding the availability of
judicial review to resolve all of the questions which may arise if the
convention method of amending the Constitution is ever implemented. With respect to matters of textual interpretation of article V,
the fact that a majority of the Court has never accepted the position of
Justice Black in Coleman and the continued vitality of the Court's
holding in Powell leave open the possibility that the Court will "say
what the law is" 10 4 by interpreting the text of article V. With respect
to the review of questions of fact which Congress has already determined, the possibility of judicial review seems significantly less certain. As then Judge Stevens noted in Dyer v. Blair, °a "A question that
might be answered in different ways for different amendments must
surely be controlled by political standards rather than standards easily
6
characterized as judicially manageable." 10
The Committee is aware that, while all of the recent cases involve the allocation of power between branches of the federal government, many of the issues involved in the convention method of
amendment implicate the allocation of power between the Congress
and the states. However, the two issues found nonjusticiable in Coleman-undue time-lapse for ratification and the power of a state
legislature to ratify after having first rejected ratification-clearly
implicated federalism concerns. Yet, they were found to be nonjusticiable.
In sum, therefore, the Committee believes that Goldwater does
not suggest that all questions involving a subject matter committed by
the text to another branch are nonjusticiable. Accordingly, the remaining precedent need not be read as entirely precluding all judicial
review of questions arising under a convention method of proposing
constitutional amendments.
D. Potential Applications of the Baker v. Carr Criteria
The case law on the political question doctrine teaches us that
there is no single, definitive answer to the question whether issues
103 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1001.
104 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.

105390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. I11. 1975).
106 Id.

at 1302.
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arising from the convention method are justiciable. What emerges
from the cases is a consensus, clearly expressed in Baker v. Carr,107 on
criteria that will be used to answer the question of justiciability, issueby-issue. To predict how the Supreme Court would apply these criteria in a particular case is simply not possible, even if it is worthwhile.
The Committee can, however, show how the Baker v. Carr criteria
might apply in three important issues that would undoubtedly arise
were two-thirds of the states to submit applications to Congress for a
limited agenda convention.
1. Whether the State May Apply for, and Congress
Call, a Limited Agenda Convention?
A General Agenda Convention?
The Supreme Court might easily justify reviewing the limited/
general agenda issue under the criteria of Baker v. Carr. The language
of article V does not clearly commit resolution of this issue either to
Congress or the convention. Moreover, the potential for Congress and
the convention coming to loggerheads on the issue is considerable. The
judicial power exists, in part, to resolve "irreconcilable positions"
taken by separate departments of the political branches of government.
Congress, it is true, has the role in article V of judging whether
the states have made the requisite number of applications for a convention, and the role of judging the number of applications necessarily
includes judging their validity, including a determination whether an
application seeking a limited/general agenda convention is valid. Yet
article V does not clearly assign the task of judging validity exclusively
to Congress, free from supervision by the Supreme Court. The "commitment" of the limited/general agenda issue to a "coordinate political department" is not "textually demonstrable."
Nor would resolution of the issue be hampered by a "lack of
judicially manageable standards." Once the Supreme Court decides
whether the agenda of a convention must be general or may be
limited, implementation of the decision would not be difficult. The
states and Congress would know their respective rights and duties as a
result of the decision and future conflicts touching on the issue would
be easy to settle. The limited/general agenda issue reasonably falls
within the Court's duty to "say what the law is." 108

107

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

108Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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The last criterion of Baker v. Carr, involving prudential considerations, is the most difficult to discuss prospectively. Were Congress
and the convention to override a pronouncement by the Supreme
Court that limited agenda conventions are unconstitutional, and were
the states to ratify an amendment produced by such a convention, the
Supreme Court would nonetheless be capable of declaring the amendment inyalid in any subsequent proceeding requiring application of
the amendment. Furthermore, Congress has no distinctive political
contribution to make to the process of construing the words of article
V with respect to the issue of general/limited agenda conventions. By
taking the matter of construction into its own hands, the Supreme
Court would be ruling on Congress' construction of the Constitution,
rather than legislating in its own right.
2. Assuming States May Apply for a Convention
Limited to a Single Subject, Whether Congress
Has Properly Determined that the Requisite
Number of States Have Submitted
Applications on the Same Subject?
Whether the Supreme Court may review a congressional determination that a requisite number of states have submitted applications on the same subject is a considerably more difficult issue to
resolve. The language of article V clearly assigns to Congress the task
of determining whether it has received a sufficient number of applications. Assuming that Congress permits limited agenda applications
and the Supreme Court acquiesces, Congress must also determine
whether all the applications call for a convention on the same subject.
The extent to which the Supreme Court can review Congress' determination, however, remains unclear.
Assume, for example, that Congress receives thirty applications
calling for a convention limited to the subject of a balanced budget,
and four applications limited to the subject of abortion. Were Congress to declare that it received thirty-four applications on the same
subject, the requisite number today for calling a convention, the issue
would be squarely presented whether the Supreme Court could review Congress' declaration. Easy as it might be in this instance to
resolve the issue in the affirmative, we must also consider whether the
Supreme Court may review a determination in which the erroneous
judgment of Congress is less apparent. Accompanying any assertion of
justiciability, in other words, is the need to determine the intensity
with which the Court will scrutinize the decision it reviews.
As a theoretical matter, the Supreme Court could perform the
task of determining whether the states' petitions involve the same
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subject matter. State courts have traditionally found it possible to
adjudicate the "same subject matter" issue when required to do so by a
state constitution. 0 9 However, the doctrine of separation of powers
has a distinctly different history in the federal sphere than it has had
in the state context. Moreover, issues of federalism arise since the
states, authors of the petitions, are represented in Congress which has
already made a "same subject matter" determination. Consequently,
the constitutional consequences of intervention by the United States
Supreme Court in the article V amendment process would be far more
serious than similar involvement by state courts in the state constitutional amendment process. The Supreme Court might be expected to
intervene only in egregious cases; in all others, it likely would accord a
high degree of deference to the previous determination of Congress.
3. Whether the Amendments a Convention
Proposes Conform to the Subject
of the States' Applications?
The difference between this issue and the second is that it arises
after Congress has fashioned a rule for the agenda of the convention,
and the Court in this instance is called upon to determine whether
Congress is living up to the rule it has fashioned in reporting amendments of the convention out to the states for ratification. Hence, the
Court is less involved in the creation of a standard than in its traditional function of ensuring that a standard created has been properly
applied. Nevertheless, congressional determination that a proposed
amendment falls within or without the ambit of the limited agenda
Congress has defined is a classic application of law to fact which the
Court might wish to leave to Congress, reviewable if at all, only under
a "clearly erroneous" or perhaps an "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
E. To What Extent Can Congress Make
Article V Issues Justiciable?
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that Congress cannot make
justiciable issues that fail to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of article III.110 There is, therefore, no assurance that the Court
would accept a congressional invitation to share the political heat of
the amending process. However, if the Court were to determine that
the issue was justiciable in the constitutional sense, the Court might
well determine that the existence of a statute counseled against the
10§See,

e.g., Carter v. Burson, 230 Ga. 511, 518-2 0, 198 S.E.2d 151, 156 (1973).

t10 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972).
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invocation of the prudential criteria of Baker v. Carr. A statement by
Congress that it wishes the Courts to review issues arising from the
convention method of originating amendments would minimize the
danger of multifarious pronouncements by separate branches of government. It would reduce the chance that judicial action would be
considered disrespectful to Congress. Furthermore, by providing a
mechanism for review, Congress does not default on its obligation to
deliberate and otherwise perform its guiding legislative role. Inasmuch as the prudential criterion of Baker v. Carr is the stumbling
block to justiciability of the three issues discussed above, a statute
conferring justiciability on the Court could go a long way towards
satisfying the Court that its intervention is appropriate.
F. The Implications of Uncertain
Judicial Review of Article V Questions
No process of government poses more hazards for our constitutional system than the convention method of originating amendments.
The potential for political conflict and collision between branches of
government is severe. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court is able to
facilitate the convention method by serving as ultimate arbiter, its
most divisive political consequences may be avoided. The Supreme
Court has performed the desirable function of acting as the guarantor
of political unity in many other areas of United States political history. Consistent with article III requirements, we believe that the
Supreme Court ought to perform this function as much as it is able in
the amendment process of article V.
Nevertheless, discussion of the possibility of a federal convention
by lawyers has generally included undisguised apprehension about
what such a convention might do to the structure of government and
the protection of individual liberties believed to be imbedded in the
Constitution we know today. The apprehension appears to be attributable not only to the fact that the nation has never had a constitutional convention since the "runaway" and revolutionary gathering in
Philadelphia in 1787, but also because judicial review may be limited.
Cut loose from the traditional moorings of judicial review in an
emotionally and politically charged environment of a federal convention, most commentators would prefer that Congress propose the
amendment for which the convention has been petitioned so as to
avoid the unknown risks of an assembled convention exceeding its
"call."
The Committee is persuaded that the proposed federal constitutional convention procedures bills are necessary and desirable in part
because issues raised in the context of an article V convention may be

560

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:529

immune from judicial review. In the absence of judicial review, the
checks and balances in the nation's system of separation of powers will
consist of those within the constitutional arsenal of Congress and the
states. The Committee further believes that it is most desirable that
the procedures by which these checks and balances will operate be
thought out well in advance, freed from any concern for a particular
amendment, and clearly incorporated in legislation.
Such steps, in our judgment, can eliminate some of the unwarranted fears currently informing the federal convention controversy.
The procedures outlined in the current federal convention procedures
bills not only give direction to the states with respect to the convention
mode of amendment but also emphasize the gravity of a decision by a
state legislature to petition Congress for a convention.
Some commentators, most notably Professor Black, have criticized the idea of a federal convention procedures bill, arguing that
one Congress cannot bind another."' This criticism is unfounded.
Congress has often acted by statute in defining separation of powers
issues. Many examples of such legislation can be given,1 2 but the best
illustration is the War Powers Resolution passed in 1973.1 3 That
legislation defined the respective roles for Congress and the President
in the introduction of armed forces into areas of imminent hostilities.
Passed by the 93d Congress, the War Powers Resolution remains in
effect until repealed or modified by subsequent congressional action.
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution-just as it would
enact a federal convention procedures bill-pursuant to its powers
under article I, section 8, clause 18: "To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." In defining convention procedures, Congress must be
viewed as exercising its traditional constitutional power. The possibility that the exercise of such power will not be reviewed in every
instance by the judiciary is neither surprising nor alarming. Congress
has had substantial experience in making unreviewable constitutional

See, e.g., Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J.
189, 191-94 (1972).
112 See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (succession to the presidency); 28 U.S.C. §§
1738-1739 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (full faith and credit obligations of the states); 31 U.S.C. §§ 6567 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
"I War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976)).
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determinations."14 Constitutional determinations made by Congress,
like those rendered by a court, involve issues of fairness and common
sense. Congress' duty to function as a constitutional arbiter in matters
affecting separation of powers and federalism is no less compelling
5
than that of the federal courts when individual liberties are at stake. 1
Those commentators who criticize congressional performance in
this context as policymaking in the guise of constitutional adjudication
conveniently forget the recognized legislative function performed by
federal courts in giving content to the meaning of the equal protection
clause. Contrary to the fears expressed by such commentators, Congress and the courts share many of the techniques of arriving at
constitutional determinations. Like courts, Congress acts on a policy
level in rendering constitutional decisions. Where a court can overrule
itself, Congress can amend or repeal its constitutional determinations.
Recognition of some of the similarities in decisionmaking processes
may help to alleviate some-but by no means all-of the legitimate
anxiety created by the prospect of a "runaway" convention subject
only to apparent political checks of Congress.
CONCLUSION

The Committee favors passage of a constitutional convention
procedures bill. We are persuaded by current scholarship on the
subject that Congress can call a limited agenda as well as a general
constitutional convention. While we cannot predict the likelihood of
judicial review of every issue that arises in the article V context, we
favor a procedures bill which provides for judicial review.

See Ripple, Judicial Review of Congressional Determinations Pursuant to the Convention
Method of Amending the Constitution, in ConstitutionalConvention ProceduresHearings, supra
note 16, at 431.
I" See, e.g., Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms,
91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
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